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ABSTRACT 
Rise in the underground economy creates problems for the policy-makers 
to formulate economic policies, especially the monetary and fiscal policies. It is 
found that if there was no tax evasion, budgets balance might have been zero 
and positive for some years and we would not have needed to borrow as much 
as we had borrowed. It is concluded that the impact of the underground 
economy is significant to the movements of the formal economy, but the impact 
of formal economy is insignificant in explaining the movements in the 
underground economy. In the long run, underground economy and official 
economy are positively associated. It is estimated that the underground economy 
ranges between Rs 2.91 trillion and Rs 3.34 trillion (54.6 percent of GDP to 62.8 
percent of GDP respectively) in 2005 and tax evasion ranges between Rs 302 
billion and Rs 347 billion (5.7 percent of GDP to 6.5 percent of GDP 
respectively) in 2005. Underground economy and tax evasion were increasing 
very rapidly in the early 1980s but the rate of increase accelerated in the 1990s. 
It declined in 1999, but reverted to an increasing trend until 2003. It declined 
again in 2004 and 2005. 
 
JEL classification: E26, H26 
Keywords: Underground Economy, Tax Evasion  
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1.  INTRODUCTION* 
Illegal activities such as smuggling, corruption, black-marketing, 
narcotics, informal legal jobs etc. constitute the underground economy. These 
activities are not in the tax net and have significant negative impact on social 
welfare of the country. Almost all the transactions made in the underground 
economy are through cash, e.g., payments to the contractual workers, 
transactions in illegal sales, transactions involved in smuggling and drug 
trafficking, cash payments to the shopkeepers who do not provide valid cash 
memos1 etc. In general, self-employed persons are involved in tax evasion and 
underground economic activities because there is no formal system of 
documentation of self-employed persons and their activities. 
Underground economy generally exists in every country, however, the 
policy-makers are especially concerned about the rise of the underground 
economy. It creates difficulties for the policy-makers to formulate the policy 
especially the monetary policy. On the other hand, increase in tax evasion is 
mostly associated with the fiscal policy, i.e., increase in tax rates erodes the tax 
base, which eventually reduces the willingness to pay taxes even when the 
Government reduces the tax rates. Government thus fails to impose progressive 
taxation and in order to get revenues they impose different taxes or increase the 
tax rates or increase the price of those commodities whose demand is inelastic to 
its price, e.g., wheat flour (this is known as inflation tax). As a result, fiscal 
deficit and inflation increases in the country. This problem results in gradual 
weakening of the economic and social basis of collective arrangements 
[Schneider and Enste (2000)]. Furthermore, the statistics on unemployment, 
labour force, income, consumption and other welfare indicators are unreliable, 
which is the major hurdle in the path of policy-making.  
Contrary to the above, increase in the underground economy affects 
positively to the formal economy. Empirical findings of Schneider (1998) show 
that at least two-third of the income earned in the shadow economy is 
immediately spent in the official economy. However, some studies show 
opposite results, e.g., Yasmin and Rauf (2003) conclude that the underground 
economy and tax evasion affects formal GDP2 negatively in Pakistan.   
                                                 
Acknowledgements: I am thankful to Dr Nadeem Ul Haque, Dr A. R. Kemal, Dr Faiz 
Bilquees, and Mr Mahmood Khalid for sending me useful comments on this paper. All errors of 
course should be attributed to the author. 
1Although they accept credit cards, the shops even in Islamabad prefer taking cash because 
use of credit cards forces them to pay taxes.   
2There are certain econometric problems with their regression approach. 
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Tax system should simple and easy to understand because loopholes in 
the complex tax system tempt people to evade taxes which they might pay 
otherwise. Until the agriculture tax was not imposed industrialists and traders 
showed their income as income from agriculture and were exempted from 
taxation. Even now the tax on agriculture sector is significantly lower and this 
practice of tax evasion still continues. In the public sector government 
employees are not allowed to work anywhere besides their main office. 
However, there are many persons who work at more than one place3 and do not 
report their income from the second job, which remains out of the tax net.  
It is difficult to estimate the exact amount of tax evasion and the size of 
the underground economy. A number of researchers [Shabsigh (1995); Ahmad 
and Ahmad (1995); Iqbal, Qureshi, and Mahmood (1998); Aslam (1998); Khalid 
(2002); Kemal (2003) and Yasmin and Rauf (2003)] have tried to estimate it 
using Tanzi’s (1980, 1983) monetary approach. However, this is an indirect 
approach to estimate the underground economy, which can show the trend in 
underground economy but fails to provide the exact numbers [for more details 
see Kemal (2003)]. 
The primary objective of this paper is the fresh assessment of the 
underground economy and tax evasion. We also checked the long run 
relationship between the underground economy and formal economy and the 
short run causality between the two variables. The paper also explores the 
consequences of the underground economy and tax evasion. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the possible 
causes of the underground economy; Section 3 gives overview of the past 
studies; Section 4 describes the data and methodology; Empirical results are 
presented in Section 5; Consequences of the underground economy and tax 
evasion are described in Section 6; Section 7 explores the linkages between the 
formal and the underground economy; and Concluding points are drawn in 
Section 8.  
 
2.  MAIN CAUSES OF INCREASE IN THE  
UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 
The growth of the underground economy is associated with various 
factors, such as
 
rise in taxes and social security burdens, intensity of regulations 
in the official economy, especially the labour markets including forced reduction 
of weekly working time, early retirement, prohibition of not working at more 
than one office etc. Apart from economic factors certain non-economic factors 
also lead to the expansion of the underground economy such as unwillingness to 
show the accurate income etc.
 
According to Schneider and Enste (2000) micro-
                                                 
3At high rates of inflation, while income levels remain the same, people need to earn more 
to maintain the same living standard if not better. 
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sociological and psychological approaches can provide interesting additional 
insights in the decision-making process of individuals choosing to work 
underground. For example, the decline of civic virtue and loyalty towards public 
institutions and decline in tax morale of the people.4  
 
2.1.  The Burden of Tax and Social Security Contributions  
The most important determinant of the increase of the underground 
economy is the rise in tax and social security burdens [see Tanzi (1982, 1999); 
Frey and Pommerehne (1984); Feige (1989); Pozo (1996) and Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998)]. As a result of increase in tax rates 
people generally get involved in those activities where they can earn more and 
pay as less taxes as possible. Schneider and Enste (2000) state that bigger the 
difference between the total cost of labour in the official economy and after tax 
earnings (from work), greater the incentive to avoid this difference and work in 
the underground economy. Since this difference depends broadly on the social 
security system and the overall tax burden, therefore, these are the key features 
of the existence and rise of the underground economy (Ibid). 
Loayza (1996) estimates the size of the informal sector in fourteen Latin 
American countries and finds that tax burden and labour market restrictions 
increases the underground economy activity, while the strength and efficiency of 
government institutions reduces the underground economy. Neck, Hofreither, 
and Schneider (1989) investigated the determinants of a household’s supply of 
underground labour and its demand for underground goods. They concluded that 
higher marginal income tax rates imply a higher supply of underground labour, 
and higher wage rates in the official economy imply a lower supply of 
underground labour. On the other hand, they showed that the firms’ demand for 
underground labour and supply of underground goods depend positively on the 
indirect tax and wage rates in the official economy, i.e., higher the tax rates 
higher would be the underground economy. 
Schneider and Neck (1993) emphasise the complexity of taxation system. 
A complex tax schedule allows more legal tax avoidance by providing various 
tax exemptions and reductions. However, exemptions and reductions in taxes 
always lead to better welfare of the people at least in the short run. 
The main problem with the underground economy activity and tax 
evasion is that once an individual gets involved it becomes almost impossible to 
come out of it for various reasons, such as (i) their informal income, if not 
declared, cannot be taxed since there is no proper documentation for the 
informal sector in Pakistan. On the other hand, everything is taxed in the formal 
sector, (ii) Even when the policy of taxation is relieved (either reduction in tax 
rates or amnesty schemes) tax evaders have fear that government is trying to 
                                                 
4For further details see Frank (1988). 
  
4 
cheat them; once they are registered with the tax network the tax rates will be 
raised once again and they will be picked up very easily because then the 
government will have full information about their informal activities and 
incomes. Spiro (1993) finds for Canada that people once working in the 
underground economy prefer the high profiles from irregular activities, develop 
social networks and personal relationships and hence will not return to the 
official economy even in the long run. 
 
2.2.  Intensity of Regulations 
Regulatory frameworks are generally designed to get control over 
certain things. For example, the role of monopoly control authority (MCA) 
is to protect consumer rights by creating competition among different firms 
so that consumers can buy same products at competitive prices from 
different producers. It prohibits the monopoly situation in the country, which 
improves efficiency as well. Increasing the number of regulations for any 
market is not a good policy to adopt; more regulations mean more 
restrictions which lead to increased labour costs in the official economy. 
Since most of these costs can be shifted onto employees, it reduces 
individuals’ choices to work in the official economy. As a result, they would 
work in the informal/unofficial sector, which thus leads to more tax evasion 
and increase in the underground economy. Intensity of regulation is often 
measured by the number of laws and requirements such as licenses, and 
various other labour laws, e.g., labour restrictions for foreigners, price 
controls and trade barriers.  
Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) predict, inter alia, that countries 
with more regulations tend to have a higher share of unofficial economy in total 
GDP. They estimated that one point increase of the regulation index (ranging 
from 1 to 5, with 5 = the most regulation in a country) leads to 8.1 percentage 
point increase in the share of the underground economy. They conclude that the 
enforcement of regulation is the key factor for the burden levied on firms and 
individuals that drives them into the underground economy. Friedman, et al. 
(1999) show that more regulations are correlated with larger underground 
economy. They estimated that one point increase in an index of regulation 
(ranging from 1–5) leads to 10 percent increase in the underground economy.5, 6 
Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998) find that countries with a 
better rule of law have smaller underground economy. Transition countries have 
higher levels of regulation leading to a significantly higher incidence of bribery, 
higher effective taxes on official activities, and a large discretionary framework 
of regulations and consequently, larger underground economies.  
                                                 
5Both studies are based on cross country analysis. 
6To read more about cost of regulation see De Soto (1989). 
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These findings demonstrate that government should put more emphasis 
on reducing the intensity of regulations or at least improve the enforcement of 
laws and regulations instead of increasing the number of regulations [Schneider 
and Enste (2000)].  
 
2.3.  Social Transfers 
Social transfers such as zakat and subsidies7 discourage people to work 
especially in the official economy because their overall income is higher if they 
receive these transfers while working in the underground economy. However, 
this does not contribute significantly to the underground economy as far as 
Pakistan’s is concerned. Pensions which have a major proportion in social 
transfers in Pakistan may contribute but very little to the underground economy.  
 
3.  OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE PAST 
Kemal (2003) comprehensively reviews the past studies including 
Shabsigh (1995), Ahmad and Ahmad (1995), Iqbal, Qureshi, and Mahmood 
(1998), and Aslam (1998). All these studies used Tanzi’s (1980, 1983) monetary 
approach to estimate the size of the underground economy and tax evasion. 
There are several shortcomings of this approach, which lead to incomparable 
estimates of the underground economy and tax evasion (in figures).8 These 
problems were also comprehensively discussed in my previous paper, i.e., 
Kemal (2003). Let’s look at the other studies which were not discussed in my 
previous paper.  
Khalid (2002) and Yasmin and Rauf (Y-R) (2003) estimated the 
underground economy and tax evasion using monetary approach but got 
different estimates from Kemal (2003). However, the trend of the underground 
as percentage of GDP is the same in all the three studies (see Graph 1 below), 
which shows that the underground economy as percentage of GDP started 
increasing at a rapid rate after 1991 and in 1998 it was maximum and then 
started declining.  
Time period and benchmark period is the same in Y-R (2003) compared 
to Kemal (2003) but the definition of dependent variable9 is different. Moreover, 
interest rate is used by Y-R (2003) as an explanatory variable which was absent 
                                                 
7In Pakistan there is not social security system which says that if you are unemployed and 
permanent resident of that country you will get minimum amount to maintain your subsistence level. 
This system is applied in UK and some other countries. 
8All the indirect approaches have several shortcomings and monetary approach is the best 
among those approaches [see Kemal (2003)]. 
9Y-R (2003) used ratio of currency in circulation to M2 as dependant variable, while Kemal 
(2003) used ratio of foreign currency accounts in conjunction with currency in circulation to M2 as 
dependant variable. 
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in Kemal (2003) due to insignificant impact on the dependent variable. Dummy 
variable is not used by Y-R (2003), which was used by Kemal (2003) to capture 
the impact of hundi after liberalisation of foreign currency accounts. Similar to 
Iqbal, Qureshi, and Mahmood (1998), Y-R (2003) used lagged value of tax to 
GDP ratio as an explanatory variable, while Kemal (2003) used the current 
period tax to GDP ratio. The results of the estimated equation of both the studies 
are given in Table 1.  
Khalid (2002) and Kemal (2003) used same methodology, same 
dependant variable but different benchmark periods, i.e. former used 1975 as 
benchmark year while later used 1973 as benchmark year. Moreover, real 
interest rate and GDP per capita is used by Khalid (2002) which are insignificant 
in Kemal (2003) and were not used in the final equation. Instead of using per 
capita growth Kemal (2003) used GDP growth as a proxy to economic 
development.  
The estimates of underground differs due to different dependent 
variables used by different authors, different benchmark periods taken in 
each study, different explanatory variables chosen, different time period etc. 
The estimates of the underground economy calculated from this approach 
are good in examining the trend but not the exact size of the underground 
economy. 
 
Graph 1.  Underground Economy Estimates by Khalid (2002),  
Kemal (2003), and Y-R (2003) 
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Table 1 
Results of Estimates of Regression Equation  
Kemal (2003), Y-R (2003), and Khalid (2002) 
 Kemal (2003) Y-R (2003) Khalid (2002) 
Variable Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Constant 0.114 1.87*** 0.151 2.78* 0.1604  
Tax to GDP Ratio 1.067 2.22**   0.667  
One-period Lag of Tax to GDP Ratio   0.848 3.04*   
Banking Services –1.34E-05 –2.08** –2.166 –3.32* 2.37E-05  
Growth Rate of GDP –0.506 –1.58 –0.094 –1.01   
Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP     –0.2061  
Real Rate of Interest     –0.0084  
One-period Lag of Interest Rate   –0.006 –1.47   
DUM 91 0.060 2.92*   0.0164  
Lag Dependent Variable 0.327 1.92*** 0.401 2.44** 0.3537  
 R2 = 0.75, F = 14.67, h= -1.36 R2 = 0.82, F = 21.9, h= 0.34 R2 = 0.95, DW = 2.23 
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4.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Annual data on currency in circulation, M1, M2, total number of bank 
deposits, total number of bank accounts, interest rate, and resident foreign 
currency accounts are taken from various issues of the Annual Report of The 
State Bank of Pakistan and Hand Book of Statistics on Pakistan Economy 2005 
by the State Bank of Pakistan. Data on GDP, GNP, inflation, and real per capita 
income are taken from various issues of the Economic Survey, and the data on, 
sales tax on imports, custom duties, and total tax revenues are taken from 
various issues of the CBR Annual Report. Data are collected from 1973 to 2005 
because disaggregated data of money supply, GDP, and GNP are not available 
for Pakistan for the pre 1973 period. 
 
4.1.  Construction of Variables 
Real interest rate is computed by subtracting inflation rate from nominal 
interest rate. Variable of banking services (BS) is obtained by dividing total 
number of bank deposits by total number of bank accounts. Growth rate of GDP 
is calculated by the following formula applied on GDP at constant factor cost. 
Growth rate of GDP = 
1
1
−
−−
t
tt
GDP
GDPGDP  
 
4.2.  Model 
The size of the underground economy can be estimated by direct as well 
as indirect methods. Direct methods are micro approaches that rely upon either 
survey and samples based on voluntary replies, or tax auditing [for details see 
Kemal (2003); Schneider and Enste (2000) and Pyle (1989)]. Indirect methods 
rely on discovering the traces which the black economy leaves in its wake. 
There are different types of indirect approaches such as monetary approach, 
income and expenditure approach, labour market approach and physical input 
method (electricity consumption approach). The details of these approaches 
described in Kemal (2003), Schneider and Enste (2000) and Pyle (1989) show 
that every approach has its shortcomings but monetary approach is the best and 
most commonly and easily applied approach among these to estimate the size of 
the underground economy and tax evasion.  
Kemal (2003) concluded from replicating different studies using Tanzi’s 
monetary approach that choosing a functional form is a major concern because 
using equation in double log form, semi log form or simple linear form 
fundamentally changes the results; choosing a meaningful benchmark is also a 
major obstacle, which should be resolved at the outset; changing the time period 
changes the results drastically, also evident from Tanzi (1983); inclusion and 
exclusion of variables from the model results in significant difference in the 
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estimates, therefore, inclusion of relevant variables is very important. Definition 
of dependent variable is also vital and should be defined with great care. 
According to Tanzi (1980), the estimates of the underground economy 
computed from indirect approach (monetary approach) should not be taken as 
precise measures, it could be taken as broad indications of trends and of orders 
of magnitude because they are sensitive to the assumptions. Therefore, whatever 
results are obtained from the estimation should not be taken as the exact size of 
the underground economy and tax evasion. Similar to Kemal (2003) in this 
paper we have formulated the Tanzi specification according to the macro 
economic situation in Pakistan and to check the robustness of the estimates we 
estimated three models, described below.  
DtGtBS
tY
T
tM
FCACC λ+ϕ+γ+β+α=+ 




2
 
                      t
tM
FCACC ε+−
+δ+ 


12
  … … … (1) 
ttDtGtBStY
T
tM
FCACC ε+ϕ+λ+ϕ+γ+β+α=+ 



 inf
2
 … (2) 
t
tM
FCACCDttY
T
tM
FCACC ε+−
+δ+λ+ϕ+β+α=+ 






12
inf
2
 (3) 
 
 CC = Currency in Circulation 
 DD = Demand Deposits 
 FCA = Foreign Currency Accounts 
 M2 = Money Supply 
 T = Total Tax Revenues 
 Y = GDP at current market prices 
 BS = Banking Services 
 G = Growth Rate of Real GDP 
 Inf = Rate of Inflation 
 D = Dummy variable defines 1 for 1990 to 2005 and zero otherwise 
 ε  = Error Term 
 Subscript t shows time period. 
Year 1973 has been chosen a benchmark because reliable statistics for 
Pakistan in the pre-1973 period are not available and the severity of the problem 
of the underground economy also started after nationalisation. Significance of 
using foreign currency accounts in conjunction with the currency in circulation 
as the dependent variable arises from the fact that foreign currency accounts 
served as a powerful source of financing the transactions in the underground 
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economy because the accounts are completely confidential, easily transferable 
and can be used as liquid money. Significance of using demand deposits in 
conjunction with currency in circulation and foreign currency accounts as 
dependent variable is that demand deposits can be treated as liquid money 
because we can draw as much money as we want from these accounts.10 Dummy 
variable is used to capture the impact of foreign currency accounts after 1990. 
 
4.3.  Methodology 
For each year predicted values of currency ratio including tax variables 
tM
FCACC 


 +
2
and without tax variables 
wtM
FCACC 


 +
2
are calculated by 
estimated regression equation. The difference between the two terms gives us an 
indication that how much currency holding is tax induced. This difference is 
then multiplied with M2 to get illegal money. Subtracting illegal money from 
M1 gives legal money in the economy. Velocity of money in the underground 
economy is calculated by dividing national income with legal money. Assuming 
velocity of the money is the same for both legal and illegal money, multiplying 
velocity of money with illegal money gives the underground economy. Tax 
evasion is calculated by multiplying underground economy with total tax to 
GDP ratio. Mathematically we can write it as,  
2*
22
)( M
M
FCACC
M
FCACCIMMoneyIllegal
wtt



 

 +−

 +=  … (4) 
IMM(LM)LegalMoney −= 1  … … … … (5) 
LM
GNPV)Velocity ( =  … … … … … (6) 
VIMUEdEconomyUndergroun *)( =  … … … (7) 


=
GNP
TotalTaxesUETETaxEvasion *)(  … … … (8) 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
Dependent variable is the same in all the three models as was in Kemal 
(2003) and the results are reported in Table 2. The results turned out to be 
different from my previous estimated equation in (Ibid). The significance level 
of the lagged dependent variable increases from 7 percent to 25 percent level of 
significance.  
                                                 
10If the amount is too big, one can draw from his/her account on only one-day notice. 
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Table 2 
Results of Estimates of Regression Equation 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Variables Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Constant 0.116 1.92*** 0.118 1.81*** 0.015 0.21 
Tax to GDP ratio 0.889 1.90*** 1.745 3.53* 1.159 2.42** 
Banking Services –1.14E-06 –3.12* –1.43E-06 –4.33*   
Growth Rate of GDP –0.348 –1.25 –0.597 –2.20**   
DUM 91 0.061 3.05* 0.091 6.10* 4.12E-02 –2.77* 
Lag Dependent Variable 0.358 2.19**   0.42 2.64** 
Inflation Rate   0.152 1.75*** 0.194 2.38** 
 
 
R2 = 0.75 
F = 15.84 
h-test = -0.10 
R2 = 0.73 
F = 14.66 
DW = 1.77 
R2 = 0.75 
F = 19.22 
h-test =-0.93 
Note: *, **, ***Indicate significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
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Equation 1 
It can be seen from Table 2 that the coefficient of the tax to GDP ratio is 
positive and significant at 6 percent level. This implies that higher the tax rate, 
higher will be the currency holdings. Negative and significant association between 
the banking services and currency ratio implies that the improvement in banking 
services significantly lowers the demand for currency holding. Coefficient of 
growth shows that higher level of economic growth is expected to decrease the 
demand for currency holdings but its impact is insignificant. Since its t-value is 
greater than one and the signs of the coefficient is also correct, therefore, we can 
use it for predicting (estimating) the size of the underground economy. Dummy 
variable, which shows that impact of hundi and other transactions through foreign 
currency accounts, turns out to be a highly significant variable. Coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable is positive and significant. R2 is 0.75 and the F-statistic 
is also significant which implies that the explanatory variables are significantly 
explaining the dependent variable. h-test shows that there is no serious problem of 
autocorrelation in the regression estimates.  
 
Equation 2 
In Equation 2 the insignificant lagged dependant variable is replaced with 
the inflation rate. It is expected to have positive association between inflation 
and currency holdings because due to rise in inflation people tend to hold more 
money to maintain the same living standards they were living before. 
Coefficient of the tax to GDP ratio is positive and significant at 1 percent level, 
which implies that higher the tax rate, higher will be the currency holdings. 
Value of coefficient exceeds unity, i.e., 1.745,11  which shows that one percent 
change in the tax to GDP ratio leads to change in currency ratio by 1.745. 
Similar to Equation 1, negative and significant association between the banking 
services and currency ratio implies that the improvement in banking services 
lower the demand for currency holding. Coefficient of growth shows that higher 
level of economic growth is expected to decrease the demand for currency 
holdings significantly.12 Similar to Equation 1, dummy variable is highly 
significant, which supports the impact of hundi and other illegal transactions 
through foreign currency accounts. Coefficient of the inflation shows significant 
positive association between the currency holdings and the inflation rate. R2 is 
0.73 and the F-statistic is also significant which implies that the explanatory 
variables are significantly explaining the dependent variable. DW shows no 
serious problem of autocorrelation.  
                                                 
11The coefficient of tax to GDP ratio is different from Kemal (2003) and Equation 1. 
12Coefficient of growth was insignificant in Kemal (2003) but it is significant in the present 
study in both Equation 1 and Equation 2. However, the value of the coefficient is higher in Equation 
2 than in Equation 1 and in Kemal (2003). 
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Equation 3 
In Equation 3 the coefficient of the tax to GDP ratio is positive and 
significant at 5 percent level, which implies that increase in taxes forces the 
consumers to hold more currency to maintain the same level of living standards 
as he/she was enjoying before the change in tax rates. Similar to Equation 2, 
value of the coefficient exceeds unity, i.e., 1.159, which shows that one percent 
change in the tax to GDP ratio leads to change in currency ratio by 1.159. 
Similar to Equation 1 and 2, dummy variable is significantly affecting the 
currency ratio. Coefficients of the lagged dependent variable and inflation are 
positive and highly significant, which implies that both variables have 
significant impact on the behaviour of people to hold more currency. R2 is 0.75 
and the F-statistic is also significant which implies that the explanatory variables 
are significantly explaining the dependent variable. Value of h-test shows no 
serious problem of autocorrelation.  
 
5.1.  Estimates of the Underground Economy 
The estimates of the underground economy and tax evasion are reported 
in Table 3. The size of the underground economy and tax evasion differs for 
each estimated equation because these values are very sensitive to the values of 
estimated coefficient. These estimates should not be taken as exact measures but 
it can be used as overall trend. 
 
Equation 1 
The estimates of the underground economy from Equation 1 show that the 
underground economy was 16.3 percent of the GDP in the base year (1974). It 
increased to 24.8 percent in 1984 but in 1991 it declined to 19.7 percent. However, 
between 1991 and 1998 the underground economy increased rapidly; it was 38.7 
percent in 1998 but declined to 28.5 percent of GDP in 1999. In the next four 
years it increased to 35.7 percent and again declined to 31.4 percent in 2005.  
 
Equation 2 
The estimates of the underground economy from Equation 2 show that the 
underground economy was 38.02 percent of the GDP in the base year (1974). It 
increased to 49.29 percent in 1984 but in 1991 it declined to 36.09 percent. 
However, between 1991 and 1997 the underground economy increased rapidly; it 
was 74.92 percent in 1997 but declined to 46.1 percent of GDP by 1999. In 2003 it 
again increased to 68.2 percent and again declined to 64.8 percent in 2005.  
 
Equation 3 
The estimates of the underground economy from Equation 3 show that 
the  underground economy was 22.4 percent of the GDP in the base year (1974).  
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Table 3 
Trend Estimates of Underground Economy and Tax Evasion 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
(As % of GDP) (As % of GDP) (As % of GDP) 
Years 
UGE TE 
UGE TE 
UGE TE 
UGE TE UGE 
TE 
UGE TE 
1974 14530 1543 16.34 1.74 33806 3591 38.02 4.04 19914 2115 22.40 2.38 
1975 17569 1792 15.68 1.60 37139 3788 33.14 3.38 24024 2450 21.44 2.19 
1976 22381 2371 17.04 1.81 41449 4392 31.56 3.34 30716 3255 23.39 2.48 
1977 25331 2702 16.77 1.79 46692 4981 30.91 3.30 34712 3703 22.98 2.45 
1978 33642 3735 18.91 2.10 62080 6892 34.90 3.87 46295 5140 26.02 2.89 
1979 41452 4953 21.10 2.52 77086 9210 39.24 4.69 57437 6863 29.23 3.49 
1980 53033 6923 22.55 2.94 107247 14000 45.60 5.95 73787 9632 31.38 4.10 
1981 59845 7854 21.51 2.82 119484 15680 42.95 5.64 82987 10891 29.83 3.91 
1982 78334 11205 24.17 3.46 155035 22176 47.83 6.84 109518 15666 33.79 4.83 
1983 83686 10674 22.97 2.93 153022 19517 41.99 5.36 116362 14841 31.93 4.07 
1984 104065 13697 24.79 3.26 206933 27236 49.29 6.49 145606 19165 34.68 4.57 
1985 103502 12696 21.92 2.69 185689 22777 39.33 4.82 143706 17627 30.44 3.73 
1986 123954 16235 24.09 3.16 230102 30138 44.72 5.86 173234 22690 33.67 4.41 
1987 146222 21181 25.54 3.70 289190 41891 50.52 7.32 205503 29768 35.90 5.20 
1988 153631 21259 22.75 3.15 307593 42563 45.54 6.30 214368 29663 31.74 4.39 
1989 168020 24114 21.85 3.14 328327 47121 42.71 6.13 233897 33568 30.42 4.37 
1990 181658 24359 20.40 2.73 348745 46765 39.16 5.25 252318 33835 28.33 3.80 
1991 201370 24227 19.73 2.37 368362 44318 36.09 4.34 278692 33530 27.31 3.29 
Continued— 
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Table 3—(Continued) 
1992 286244 36714 23.75 3.05 535393 68669 44.42 5.70 401622 51512 33.32 4.27 
1993 336609 41778 25.25 3.13 606545 75281 45.50 5.65 474701 58917 35.61 4.42 
1994 447323 57043 28.65 3.65 882804 112576 56.55 7.21 638199 81384 40.88 5.21 
1995 560450 74276 30.04 3.98 1129781 149728 60.55 8.02 802876 106404 43.03 5.70 
1996 732255 101166 34.54 4.77 1457027 201298 68.72 9.49 1066202 147303 50.29 6.95 
1997 886426 112944 36.50 4.65 1819343 231812 74.92 9.55 1300117 165655 53.54 6.82 
1998 1035081 130094 38.66 4.86 1847640 232221 69.00 8.67 1529705 192261 57.13 7.18 
1999 836950 105513 28.48 3.59 1355833 170927 46.14 5.82 1194686 150612 40.66 5.13 
2000 975737 119679 31.00 3.80 1776518 217899 56.45 6.92 1380499 169325 43.86 5.38 
2001 1158142 142938 33.83 4.18 2249573 277643 65.72 8.11 1650193 203667 48.21 5.95 
2002 1291169 163294 35.58 4.50 2331414 294853 64.25 8.13 1845766 233433 50.87 6.43 
2003 1421173 189027 35.74 4.75 2712954 360843 68.23 9.08 2027512 269674 50.99 6.78 
2004 1483904 191320 32.82 4.23 3009671 388037 66.57 8.58 2100710 270845 46.46 5.99 
2005 1675617 207165 31.42 3.88 3453420 426963 64.75 8.01 2363399 292199 44.32 5.48 
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It increased to 34.7 percent in 1984 but in 1991 it declined to 27.3 percent. 
However, between 1991 and 1998 the underground economy increased rapidly; 
it was 57.1 percent in 1998 but declined to 40.7 percent of GDP in 1999. In 
2003 it again increased to 51 percent and then declined to 44.3 percent in 2005. 
 
5.2.  Estimates of the Tax Evasion 
Estimates of tax evasion13 follow the trends similar to the estimates of the 
underground economy. Similar to the estimates of the underground economy, 
these estimates should not be taken as exact measures of tax evasion rather these 
estimates can be used as over all trend.  
 
Equation 1 
The estimates of tax evasion from Equation 1 show that tax evasion was 
1.74 percent of the GDP in the base year (1974). It increased to 3.46 percent in 
1982 and 3.7 percent in 1987 but declined to 2.4 percent in 1991. However, 
between 1991 and 1998 tax evasion increased rapidly; it was 4.86 percent in 
1998 but declined to 3.59 percent in 1999. In 2003 it increased to 4.75 percent 
and then declined to 3.88 percent in 2005.  
 
Equation 2 
The estimates of tax evasion from Equation 2 show that tax evasion was 
4.04 percent of GDP in the base year (1974). It increased to 6.84 percent in 1982 
and 7.32 percent in 1987 but declined to 4.34 percent in 1991. However, 
between 1991 and 1997 tax evasion increased rapidly; it was 9.6 percent in 1997 
but declined to 5.82 percent in 1999. In 2003 it again increased to 9.1 percent 
and then declined to 8 percent in 2005.  
 
Equation 3 
The estimates of tax evasion from Equation 2 show that tax evasion was 
2.38 percent of the GDP in the base year (1974). It increased to 4.83 percent in 
1982 and 5.2 percent in 1987 but decline to 3.29 percent in 1991. However, 
between 1991 and 1998 tax evasion increased rapidly; it was 7.2 percent in 1998 
but declined to 5.13 percent in 1999. In 2003 it again increased to 6.78 percent 
and then declined to 5.48 percent in 2005. 
These trends show that estimates of the underground economy and tax 
evasion change with the change in specification of the model. The main 
significant variable in all the three equations is tax to GDP ratio; the entire 
estimates of the underground economy and the tax evasion are based on this 
                                                 
13The estimates of tax evasion are derived as based on a strong assumption that incomes in 
the underground economy would have been taxed at the same rate as incomes in the formal 
economy. 
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single variable. Now we will check that whether trend of the underground 
economy and tax evasion is the same using the three equations. For this purpose 
we plot graphs of underground economy and tax evasion. All the three graphs 
(Graph 2, Graph 3, and Graph 4) show similar trend that the underground 
economy increased rapidly from 1991 to 1998 and then declined in 1999. It 
increased again between 1999 and 2003 and declined in 2005. Similarly, the 
graphs of tax evasion (Graph 5, Graph 6, and Graph 7) show that tax evasion 
increased rapidly from 1991 to 1998 and then declined in 1999. It increased 
again between1999 and 2003 and declined in 2005.  
Kemal (2003) attributed the rapid increases in the underground economy and 
tax evasion during 1991 and 1998 to rise in private investment level which increases 
the overall economic activity (formal and informal) and increase in smuggling. On 
the other hand increase in private sector credit and increase in the growth rate of 
formal GDP in the last three years did not increase in the underground economy, 
which may imply the better governance policies of the Government.  
 
5.3. Measuring the Size of the Underground Economy  
       and Tax Evasion 
The National Tax Reform Commission, NTRC, (1986, p103 – p104) 
estimated the underground economy and tax evasion for the year 1984 – 85, 
based on a rigorous methodology, which are the best estimates available till 
now. To estimate the exact amount of the underground economy and tax evasion 
in Pakistan we used the ratio of these estimates to the estimated values we have 
obtained for the same year (i.e., 1984 – 85) to project the estimates of the 
underground economy and tax evasion. The results are reported in Table 4, 
which show that the size of the underground economy ranges between Rs. 2.91 
trillion – Rs. 3.34 trillion (54.6 percent of GDP to 62.8 percent of GDP 
respectively) in 2005 and tax evasion ranges between Rs. 302 billion – Rs. 347 
billion (5.7 percent of GDP to 6.5 percent of GDP respectively) in 2005.  
 
Graph 2 (Equation 1).   Underground Economy as Percentage of GDP 
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Graph 3 (Equation 2). Underground Economy as Percentage of GDP 
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Graph 4 (Equation 3). Underground Economy as Percentage of GDP 
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Graph 5 (Equation 1). Tax Evasion as Percentage of GDP 
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Graph 6 (Equation 2). Tax Evasion as Percentage of GDP 
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Graph 7 (Equation 3).  Tax Evasion as Percentage of GDP 
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Table 4 
Projected Estimates of Underground Economy and Tax Evasion 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
(As % of GDP) (As % of GDP) (As % of GDP) 
Years 
UGE TE 
UGE TE 
UGE TE 
UGE TE 
UGE TE 
UGE TE 
1974 25269 2252 28.42 2.53 32770 2921 36.86 3.29 24943 2223 28.05 2.50 
1975 30554 2615 27.27 2.33 36001 3081 32.13 2.75 30091 2575 26.85 2.30 
1976 38923 3460 29.64 2.63 40179 3573 30.59 2.72 38474 3421 29.30 2.61 
1977 44053 3943 29.17 2.61 45261 4052 29.97 2.68 43479 3892 28.79 2.58 
1978 58507 5451 32.89 3.06 60178 5606 33.83 3.15 57987 5403 32.59 3.04 
1979 72089 7228 36.69 3.68 74724 7492 38.03 3.81 71943 7214 36.62 3.67 
1980 92230 10103 39.22 4.30 103961 11388 44.21 4.84 92422 10124 39.30 4.31 
1981 104076 11462 37.41 4.12 115823 12755 41.63 4.58 103946 11448 37.36 4.11 
1982 136230 16352 42.03 5.04 150285 18039 46.36 5.56 137178 16467 42.32 5.08 
1983 145538 15577 39.94 4.27 148334 15876 40.71 4.36 145750 15600 40.00 4.28 
1984 180979 19989 43.11 4.76 200593 22155 47.78 5.28 182380 20145 43.44 4.80 
1985 180000 18528 38.12 3.92 180000 18528 38.12 3.92 180000 18528 38.12 3.92 
1986 215568 23693 41.90 4.60 223052 24516 43.35 4.76 216986 23850 42.17 4.64 
1987 254294 30911 44.42 5.40 280330 34076 48.97 5.95 257404 31290 44.96 5.47 
1988 267179 31024 39.56 4.59 298169 34623 44.15 5.13 268508 31179 39.76 4.62 
1989 292203 35191 38.01 4.58 318268 38331 41.40 4.99 292969 35284 38.11 4.59 
1990 315921 35548 35.47 3.99 338060 38041 37.96 4.27 316043 35564 35.48 3.99 
1991 350202 35356 34.31 3.46 357076 36051 34.99 3.53 349078 35244 34.20 3.45 
Continued— 
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Table 4—(Continued) 
1992 497806 53579 41.30 4.45 518990 55859 43.06 4.63 503055 54145 41.74 4.49 
1993 585396 60969 43.91 4.57 587962 61237 44.11 4.59 594590 61929 44.60 4.65 
1994 777938 83246 49.83 5.33 855757 91575 54.82 5.87 799381 85544 51.21 5.48 
1995 974677 108395 52.24 5.81 1095168 121797 58.69 6.53 1005648 111843 53.90 5.99 
1996 1273462 147637 60.06 6.96 1412388 163746 66.62 7.72 1335479 154832 62.99 7.30 
1997 1541581 164826 63.48 6.79 1763603 188568 72.63 7.77 1628471 174122 67.06 7.17 
1998 1800106 189854 67.23 7.09 1791033 188901 66.89 7.05 1916043 202088 71.56 7.55 
1999 1455537 153981 49.54 5.24 1314294 139041 44.73 4.73 1496413 158310 50.93 5.39 
2000 1696901 174654 53.92 5.55 1722090 177250 54.72 5.63 1729154 177980 54.94 5.66 
2001 2014121 208598 58.84 6.09 2180652 225849 63.70 6.60 2066961 214077 60.38 6.25 
2002 2245468 238304 61.88 6.57 2259986 239849 62.28 6.61 2311928 245365 63.71 6.76 
2003 2471557 275858 62.16 6.94 2629837 293529 66.14 7.38 2539575 283458 63.87 7.13 
2004 2580653 279204 57.08 6.18 2917463 315650 64.53 6.98 2631260 284689 58.20 6.30 
2005 2914060 302328 54.64 5.67 3347617 347314 62.77 6.51 2960293 307135 55.51 5.76 
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6.  CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNDERGROUND  
ECONOMY AND TAX EVASION 
Rise in the underground economy decreases the state revenues, which in 
turn reduces the quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services 
[Schneider and Enste (2000)]. The loss of revenues is then either filled through 
increase in tax rates or by increase in price of inelastic goods, i.e., inflation tax. 
To reduce the prices in the country Government then reduces the money supply 
and increases the interest rate, which reduces the credit creation and the level of 
investment. Consequently, the overall economic activity declines.  
As discussed earlier that increase in the underground economy creates 
problems for the policymakers especially to formulate monetary and fiscal 
policies. The public sector faces the challenge of substantially reforming the 
social security and tax systems to reduce the budget deficit at the minimum 
possible level without compromising at the welfare of the people of the country. 
High tax rates and regulatory burdens cause an increase in the underground 
economy, which puts additional pressure on public finance, resulting in even 
higher tax rates and people start evading taxes more than they were evading 
before. Moreover, even if government reduces the tax rates, people will be 
reluctant to report their income eared from informal activities. This could be due 
to two factors (i) unwillingness to pay,14 and (ii) fear or lack of trust.15  
In the absence of tax evasion our budget balance could have been surplus for 
many years. Table 5 shows budget deficit and tax evasion (computed using Equation 
1) since 1976. It shows that in certain years, i.e., 1995–97 and 2000–2005, if tax 
evasion was zero the budget balance could have been surplus. However, it is straight 
forward that even if the budget balance could not be surplus, the burden of the 
budget deficit would be lessened and we would need to borrow less.  
The role of monetary policy is to enhance growth through increase in 
investment. In the presence of high and increasing underground economy it is a 
big question mark that how much money supply is needed to get better GDP 
growth. For instance, if 30 percent of the money supply goes to the activities in 
the underground economy, and the government increases money supply by 5 
percent then 1.5 percent goes into the underground economic activities. 
However, there might not be any difficulty in monetary policy formulation if the 
underground economy is growing at a constant rate, i.e., ratio of underground 
economy to formal GDP is constant. But at the increasing rate of the expansion 
of the underground economy it is difficult, which thus creates problems for the 
authorities to achieve their desired objectives, i.e., to increase GDP growth at a 
certain level though increase in money supply.  
                                                 
14They can save the amount of money that they are supposed to pay in the forms of taxes. 
15They do not trust the government and think that they might increase the tax rates again in 
the following years, and by paying taxes they will be registered in the tax net and can be penalised 
afterwards if they evade taxes. 
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Table 5 
Budget Deficit and Tax Evasion as Percentage of GDP 
Years Budget Deficit Tax Evasion Years Budget Deficit Tax Evasion 
1976 9.6 2.6 1991 8.8 3.5 
1977 8.6 2.6 1992 7.5 4.5 
1978 7.9 3.0 1993 8.1 4.6 
1979 8.9 3.7 1994 5.9 5.5 
1980 6.3 4.3 1995 5.6 6.0 
1981 5.3 4.1 1996 6.5 7.3 
1982 5.3 5.1 1997 6.4 7.2 
1983 7.1 4.3 1998 7.7 7.5 
1984 6.0 4.8 1999 6.1 5.4 
1985 7.8 3.9 2000 5.4 5.7 
1986 8.1 4.6 2001 4.3 6.3 
1987 8.2 5.5 2002 4.3 6.8 
1988 8.5 4.6 2003 3.7 7.1 
1989 7.4 4.6 2004 2.4 6.3 
1990 6.5 4.0 2005 3.3 5.8 
 
It is straight forward that these activities should be cut down because they 
weaken the system. There could be various possibilities such as increase the 
number of legal documentation, strengthening the institutions, better 
governance, improvement in tax payer records, prohibit smuggling through tariff 
rationalisation or free trade is even better, and efficiency wages could be good to 
prohibit people both from shirking on the jobs and taking bribe.  
 
7.  FORMAL ECONOMY AND THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 
Kemal (2003) stated that when formal activities are increasing 
underground economic activities are also increasing, which implies that these 
two move parallel. It associates increase in the underground economy and tax 
evasion during 1991 and 1998 with increase in the formal economy and decline 
in the underground economy after 1998 to decline in smuggling and more 
importantly low level of economic activity, i.e., decline in the formal economy. 
This argument was strongly supported by the 97.35 percent correlation found 
between the underground economy and the formal economy. In the present 
study the correlation between the formal and the underground economy is also 
significantly high; more than 94 percent.  
Theoretically we can say that when formal economy increases the 
underground economy also increases, therefore, there is a positive relationship 
between these two.  For example, when an industrialist hires some permanent 
and contractual labour he is liable to pay taxes on the number of permanent 
employees only. So he can evade/avoid taxes on contractual or piece rate 
workers.16 Therefore, when there is low level of economic activity he/she hires 
                                                 
16This is one of the reasons that employers avoid giving exact figures of their employees as 
observed during various field works for different surveys/projects. 
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less contractual or piece rate workers and hence there will be less evasion of 
taxes and lesser underground economy. But when there is an increase in the 
economic activity he/she hires more contractual or piece rate workers. He has 
the opportunity then to show even his permanent employees as contractual 
labour and evade taxes easily which contributes to the growth of the 
underground economy.  
Substantial reduction of the underground economy leads to a significant 
increase in tax revenues and therefore to greater quantity and quality of public 
goods and services, which ultimately can stimulate economic growth [Schneider 
and Enste (2000)]. However, it is not true that sometimes when decrease in the 
underground economy is accompanied by decline in overall economic activity 
then both tax evasion and tax collected from legal activities will go down and 
total tax revenues will go down as well. In this case, to increase tax revenues 
Governments take measures to increase the tax base by including more people in 
the tax net. Proper auditing of the taxpayers is also an important part of it.  
Loayza (1996) concludes that in economies where (i) the statutory tax 
burden is larger than optimal, and (ii) enforcement of compliance is too weak, 
the increase in the relative size of the underground economy generates a 
reduction in economic growth. On the other hand, Schneider (1998) shows that 
over 66 percent of earnings in the underground economy are immediately spent 
in the official sector, with positive effects on economic growth and indirect tax 
revenues.  
Corruption is one of its own kind of the underground economic activity. 
Is it good or bad for the GDP growth is certainly a question of concern. There 
are certain economies/people/researchers who want corruption free society. 
However, researchers also argue that it smoothens the process of growth and 
development. Romer (1994) suggested that corruption, as a tax on ex post 
profits, may in general stimulate the entry of new goods or technology which 
requires an initial fixed cost investment.  
Mauro (1995) finds a significant negative correlation between a 
corruption index and the investment rate or rate of GDP growth.17 Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Lobatón (1998) find a significant negative relationship between 
corruption and GDP growth but the relationship becomes insignificant if the 
underground economy is used as an independent variable. Adam and Ginsburgh 
(1985) find positive relationship between the growth of the underground 
economy and the official economy.  
Aman (2006) concluded that the growth maximising level of corruption is 
not necessarily equal to zero and that corruption leads to better income 
distribution.18 He calculated the threshold level of corruption as 8.3 (index 
                                                 
17Negative correlation implies that increase in corruption leads to higher GDP growth. 
18Though there are several other ways of improving income distribution and this could be a 
good finding but it cannot be adopted as a policy to improve income distribution. 
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ranges from 0 – 12; 0 means no corruption) and Pakistan’s corruption index was 
3 in 2003 and it was maximum during 1997 and 1998 at 6. However, this does 
not imply that we still have space to increase our level of corruption.  
Y-R (2003) using simple OLS regression concluded that both tax evasion 
and the underground economy have significant negative impact on the formal 
economy. It may be noted that their results could be spurious and one really 
needs to take care of this problem.  
The evidence shows that the relationship between the underground 
economy and the formal economy shows ambiguous results. In the short run the 
underground economy may have positive impact on formal economy but in the 
long run, because it weakens the system, it may affect the formal economy 
adversely. Long run relationship is checked using Johansen cointegration 
analysis.19  
Table 6 shows the results of stationarity test (both the variables are taken 
in log form). Philip-Perron test is applied on log of the underground economy 
because of structural break in 1998 when underground economy declined to 
very low level. KPSS20 test is also used for further confirmation of the unit root 
process in the variables. ADF and KPSS tests are applied on log of the nominal 
GDP. The results show that both the variables are non-stationary but integrated 
of orders one, which implies that there may exist long run relationship between 
the two variables. 
 
Table 6 
Results of Staionarity 
 ADF PP KPSS 
ue  –1.79 0.75* 
∆ue  –5.10* 0.27 
Y –1.24  0.70** 
∆y –3.35*** 
(–3.31**)  0.44 
Note:  *, **, *** Represent 1, 5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
          Value in parenthesis show ADF value with constant but no trend. 
 
Johansen test is applied at different lags and lags selection is based on 
minimum value of AIC.21  It is found that AIC is minimum at 5 lags when we 
use both constant and trend in cointegrating and VEC equation. The trace and 
maximum eigenvalues test show that rank is equal to one (Table 7), which 
implies that both variables are linearly dependant on each other.  
                                                 
19See Enders (2004) for the detailed methodology. 
20Significant KPSS value shows unit root (non-stationary) and insignificant shows stationary 
variables. 
21For more details on AIC and lags selection criteria, see Enders (2004). 
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Table 7 
Trace and Eigenvalues Test 
                           Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
No. of Cointegrating 
Vectors 
Eigenvalues Trace  
Statistic 
Critical Value 
(5%) 
Probability** 
None * 0.78 40.37 18.40 0.00 
At most 1 0.06 1.58 3.84 0.21 
                              Maximum Eigenvalues 
No. of Cointegrating 
Vectors 
Eigenvalues Trace  
Statistic 
Critical Value 
(5%) 
Probability** 
None * 0.78 38.79 17.15 0.00 
At most 1 0.06 1.58 3.84 0.21 
 * Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5 percent level of significance. 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
 
Table 8 shows significant positive long run association between the 
underground economy and the nominal formal GDP, which rejects our null 
hypothesis. This implies that even in the long run the formal economy and the 
underground economy moves together and have positive association. 
 
Table 8 
Results of Cointegration and Error Correction 
Variables Coefficients 
yt–1 1.00 
uet–1 –1.22 
 [–9.33]* 
Trend 0.05 
Constant 0.90 
 
                                                  Error Correction Mechanism 
 ∆y ∆ue 
Coefficient 0.34 1.02 
t-values [ 4.82] * [ 2.80] * 
Note:  *, **, *** indicate level of significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 
          Values in parenthesis are t-values. 
 
VAR results (Table 9) show that in the short run, nominal formal GDP is 
significantly affected by the movements in the underground economy but the 
underground economy is not significantly affected by the movements in the 
nominal formal GDP. Positive coefficients of the underground economy in the 
nominal  GDP imply positive significant impact of the underground economy on  
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Table 9 
VAR Results for GDP and Underground Economy 
Variables ∆y ∆ue 
∆yt–1 –0.70 –1.69 
 [–3.10]* [–1.47] 
∆yt–2 –0.62 –0.56 
 [–2.94] * [–0.52] 
∆yt–3 –0.50 –0.72 
 [–2.80] * [–0.79] 
∆yt–4 –0.21 0.17 
 [–1.23] [ 0.20] 
∆yt–5 –0.53 –0.49 
 [–3.41] * [–0.62] 
∆uet–1 0.36 0.77 
 [4.72] * [1.97] ** 
∆uet–2 0.33 0.76 
 [4.67] * [2.11] ** 
∆uet–3 0.35 0.53 
 [4.96] * [1.47] 
∆uet–4 0.24 0.54 
 [3.50] * [1.52] 
∆uet–5 0.13 0.38 
 [2.17] ** [1.25] 
Constant 0.31 0.12 
 [5.56] * [0.44] 
Trend –0.003 –0.001 
 [–4.01] * [–0.24] 
 
R2 
 
0.82 
 
0.53 
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.10 
F-statistic 4.78** 1.23 
Note:  *, **, *** Indicate level of significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 
           Values in parenthesis are t-values. 
 
the formal economy in the short run. It is also shown that the underground 
economy is positive and significantly affected by its own lags (1 and 2), which 
implies that if the underground economy starts increasing, it continuously 
increases for at least 2 years and vice versa.  
 
8.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of the paper is to estimate the size of the underground 
economy and tax evasion using fresh data and explore the impact of the 
underground economy on formal GDP. The study also describes the 
consequences of the underground economy. 
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Using the NTRC (1986) estimates of the underground economy and tax 
evasion for the year 1984-85, estimates of the size of the underground 
economy and tax evasion have been computed. The underground economy 
ranges between Rs 2.91 trillion—Rs 3.34 trillion (54.6 percent of GDP to 62.8 
percent of GDP respectively) in 2005 and tax evasion ranges between Rs 302 
billion—Rs 347 billion (5.7 percent of GDP to 6.5 percent of GDP 
respectively) in 2005. 
Underground economy and tax evasion was increasing very rapidly in the 
early eighties but the rate of increase was more in the nineties and was 
maximum in 1998. However, in 1999 it declined but then again started rising till 
2003. However, it started decreasing after 2003.  
Univariate causality has been found between the underground economy 
and the formal economy. It shows that the underground economy is causing the 
formal economy but formal economy is insignificant in explaining the 
movements in the underground economy. It is also concluded that in the long 
run underground economy and formal economy are positively associated. 
Rise in the underground economy creates problems for the policymakers 
to formulate the policies especially the monetary and fiscal policies. It is 
concluded that if there was no tax evasion budget balance for certain years 
might be positive and we would not need to borrow as much as we had 
borrowed. There could be various possible ways to cut down these activities 
which must need strict measures such as: increase the number of legal 
documentation, strengthening the institutions, better governance, decrease the 
number of regulations which prohibit people to work in the formal economy, 
improvement in tax payer records, restrict smuggling through tariff 
rationalisation or free trade is even better, and efficiency wages could be good to 
prevent people both from shirking on the jobs and taking bribe. In the long run 
we can bring awareness to the people on the benefits of paying taxes which 
improves the tax morale of the people.  
Increase in the underground economy is mostly associated with the tax 
burdens and intensity of regulations. It is difficult for the authorities to broaden 
the tax base in a very short period of time but it is the most necessary thing to 
do, which should have been done many years ago. It would be good to impose 
tax by analysing the tax Laffer curve, i.e., the optimal tax rate. Government 
should ensure that regulatory laws are implemented properly as they were made 
and reduce the number of regulations which prohibit people to work in the 
official economy.  
Future research may include strength of institutions and other relevant 
variables in explaining that what mainly causes the underground economy. One 
can also check the association between the underground economy and different 
sectors of GDP.  
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